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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLEJONE B. COOPER, Executrix ) 
and FIRSrr SECURITY BANK 
OF UTAH, N.A., Administrator 
\Vith ~Will Annexed of the Estate of 
Joe W. Cooper, Deceased. 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, Case 
- vs. - No. 11097 
DA VIS C. HOLDER, doing business 
as HOLDER ENGINEERING 
COMP ANY, and CITY OF MOAB, 
a Municipal Corporation, 
Def endant-Appella1nt. 
Plaintiffs' .. Respondents' Brief 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case concerns a claim of plaintiffs-respondents, 
as the personal representatives of the estate of an 
a:o;signee of Davis C. Holder, a former contract engi-
neer for the defendant-appellant City of Moab, for funds 
paill on the contract by the City to Holder rather than 
to the assignee. 
1 
DISPOSI'fION IN LO"WER COURT 
'l'hr trial court eutered a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs-respondents ai1d against the def endant-appel-
lant City of Moab for the sum uf $6,714.15 and costs. 
HELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-respoudents seek an affirmation of the de-
cision of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs-respondents do not controvert the state-
ment of facts set forth in appellant '8 brief except in one 
particular. It is nut complPtely accurate to say, as does 
appellant in its brief, that "No claim or attempt to sat-
isfy the pro,'isions of Section 10-7-77, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, which requires that a claim be presented to 
the governing body as a condition precedent to main-
taining an action against the City, has ever, at any time, 
been preseuted to the City Council.'' It is conceded in 
the Statement of 11-,acts in appellant's brief that plain-
tiffs did sufficiently call the assignment to the attention 
of the City Council and City Recorder of the defendant 
in December of 1962 that the defendant did honor the 
assignment thereafter (appellant's brief, page 3). 
Further, the following facts, in addition to those 
set forth in appellant's briPf, are material to the con-
sideration of this case: 
On or about the 28th day of March, 1961, said Davis 
C. Holder (herr~inafter sometimes referred to as "Hold-
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er") entered into a written agreement with the defend-
ant-appellant City of Moab (hereinafter called "City") 
under which Holder was employed to render certain engi-
neering services to City for a specified compensation 
(plaintiffs' Exhibit 1; Pretrial Order Dated April 12, 
rnfi5). Appellant does not contend that this agreement 
~was not executed in all particulars so as to be binding 
between the City and Holder. 
On the 14th day of April, 1961, Holder assigned all 
of his rights to compensation under plaintiffs' Exhibit 
1 to a trustee for the benefit of Joseph W. Cooper, (here-
inafter called "Cooper") of whose estate plaintiffs-re-
spondents (hereinafter called "respondents") are the 
pc>rsoual representatives (plaintiffs' Exhibit 3; Pretrial 
Order dated April 12, 1965). Appellant does not con-
tend that this assignment was not effective, as between 
Holder and Cooper, to entitle Cooper to have all the 
moneys earned by Holder under plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 
paid to the designated assignee. 
This assignment was acknowledged by Kenneth E. 
McDonough, then Mayor of City, on April 14, 1961 
(plaintiffs' Exhibit 3; Pretrial Order dated April 12, 
1965). This acknowledgment reads as follows: 
''I hereby acknowledge that the City of Moab, 
Utah, has received a copy of the foregoing assign-
ment and that payment under the above-men-
tioned contract shall be, made to William E. Fos-
ter, Attorney, Trustee, P. 0. Box 1598, Grand 
Junction, Colorado, until written authorization or 
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instructions to the contrary are received from 
William E. Foster. 
CITY OF l\IOAB 
By K. E. McDouGALD, /s/ 
Mayor 
DAVIS C. HoLDER /s/ 
Davis C. Holder, doing business 
as Holder Engineering 
Company.'' 
Appellant does not contend that the said l\[ayor did not 
recein~ a copy of the assignment 11or that he was not 
fully adYised of the same. On the other hand, respond-
ents conce<1e that there iH uo cYidence to show that this 
assignment and aclrnowlcllgmcnt >vas called to the at-
tention of the Recorder or City Conllcil of City until De-
cember of 1962. 
As st"t forth in page 3 of appelJant's brief, certain 
smns of money were paid to Holder by City between 
April 12, 1962, and Deccmhc1·, 1962. Appellant does not 
assert that these payments wer0 11ot properly authorized 
and paid by City or that Holder was not entitled to the 
same. It follows that if CoopPr \ms entitled to lrnYe these 
sums paid to Holder by City during this period paid to 
the trustee under the assignm011t, plaintiffs are entitled 
to the judgment re11derecl by the trial court. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
IN ANSWER TO POINT I OF APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF IT IS NOT NJDCESSARY IN ORDER 
TO BIND THE CITY TO HONOR THE AS-
SIGNMENT THAT THE REQUIREMENTS 
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FOR THE CREATION OF A NEW LIABIL-
ITY AGAINST CITY BE MET BTJT ONLY 
THAT THE CITY RECEIVE NOTICE OF 
THE ASSIGNMENT. 
Appellant, in Point I of its brief, asserts that it 
was not bound to honor the assignment in question be-
cause the Mayor did not have authority to create a finan-
cial obligation against the City without the concurrence 
of the City Council. This contention assumes that the 
ohligation of the City to give to an assignee of Holder 
the performance which it was obligated to give Holder 
is the creation of an additional liability over and above 
that which ·was originally created in favor of Holder and 
therefore the City was not bound to honor the assign-
ment unless it agreed to do so. 
Appellant does not contend that it did not have legal 
liability to Holder and this issue was laid at rest when 
Hohler was paid the sums of money due him under the 
contract with the City. 
It is the position of respondents that the City ob-
viously had legal liability to Holder and that the assign-
ment amounted to a direction or order on the part of 
Holder to the City to pay to the assignee the sum of 
money to which Holder was entitled. This approach on 
the problem is more clearly set forth on page 4 of the 
.l\frmorandum Decision of the Trial Judge, F. W. Keller, 
dated October 3, 1967, as follows: 
''As I analyze this case, the claim of the plaintiffs 
arises out of the contract duly and regularly en-
tered into between the City of Moab and the as-
5 
signor. Once that contract was rcg-ularly entered 
into, all that the City of 1\loab was entitle<l to was 
performancP on the part of the assignor. What 
the assignor did respeding what he was entitled 
to receive as compensation \Vas not a matter of 
concern to the City as long as it had proper no-
tice of the assignment.'' 
Respondents do not assert tliat the City was bound 
to honor the assignment on the theory that the acknowl-
edgment signed by the l\Iayor amounted to an agreement 
on the part of the City to honor the assignment but rather 
said acknowledgment amounted to notice to the City of 
the assignment and that the City was hound irrespective 
of whether or not it agreed to be bound. 
"In the absence of a statute to the contrary, it is 
generally held that an assignment becomes effec-
tive and valid on the mutual assent of the as-
signor and the assignee, and that, as between the 
parties, no notice to the <lebtor is necessary, the 
assignment opernting as a final and binding trans-
fer of title, and such notice being necessary only 
to charge the debtor with the duty of payment to 
the assignee." 6 C.J.S., Assignments, Section 74, 
pages 1124-1125. 
"As a general rule, tlw c011sent or acceptance of 
the debtor is not essential to the validity of an 
assignment of an entire fund or chose in action 
eith<>r as hetw0en the 1ia rties or as against the 
debtor, and the debtor will not he permitted to 
restrain such an assignment by its refusal to con-
sent thereto.'' 6 C.J.S., Assignments, Section 75, 
Page 1127. 
This principlP- that thP- agreement of the debtor is 
not necessary to obligate him to give the performance to 
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the assignee is illustrated by the case of Matson v. 
White, 122 Colo. 79, 220 P. 2d 864, 1950, wherein the 
assignor had an agreement with the defendant to the 
pffoct that the defendant was to furnish household water 
to the property of the assignor. The assignor assigned 
his interest in this contract to the plaintiffs who brought 
Ruit to require the defendants to furnish them the water 
in accordance with the terms of the contract. The Su-
preme Court of Colorado held, against the contention of 
the defendants that the assignment was not binding 
upon them, that the assignment was valid even though 
the defendants did not consent thereto and that the de-
fendants were obligated to give to the plaintiffs the per-
fornrnnce to which the assignors were originally entitled 
m1der the agreement. 
This general rule that the consent of the debtor is 
not essential to obligate him to honor the assignment is 
also applicable where the debtor is a municipal corpora-
tion and the moneys due under the contract are assigned. 
Pe(Jple's Bank v. Attala County, 156 Miss. 560, 126 So. 
192, 1930; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Village 
of Milan, 176 F. Supp. 84, District Court of Illinois, 1959. 
The principle that there is an important distinction 
between the creation of a new liability and a transfer of 
an existing liability to an assignee is clearly set 
forth in the case of Bank of Spring City v. Rhea 
County, Tenn. 59 S.W. 442, 1900, wherein notice of an 
assignment was given to McPherson, one of the Com-
missioners of the debtor County and also Secretary of 
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the Boanl of ( '.ommiss1011ers. The Tennessee Court said 
the follnwi11g in 1Joi11ti11g up the cliffereHce l>ehn~e11 •' ac-
('eptmwt:~'' a11cl ''notiee '': 
"\Ve do 11ot think that the ('Omplaintants are en-
titled to re('OYer on this order hy Yirtue of the ac-
eeptnnce, so called, made hy Mr. :McPherson. 
While, urn1n the authority of the case of Smith 
Y. HnLbard, \\·e have hold that notice to one com-
missioner was 1101 ice to all, yet this is not tanta-
mount to saying that one commissioner could 
make a coutract of aceeptance for the county, and 
thus lay the county open to suit on such accept-
ance'. As affecting the rights of the parties in this 
case, the point is not material, inasmuch as \Ye 
haYe just adjudged that the connty was liable on 
the gronncls of the as::;ignment. There is a differ-
ence in principle, howeYer, between a liability 
createcl hy assignment and notice and one created 
by an acceptance. The reqniRites of the first are 
an existing liability to the assignor, and assign-
ment of that liability to the assignee, and notice 
to the debtor. The requisites of the second are 
simply an 01«ler and an acceptance. There may· or 
not he originally any indebtedness due by the ac-
ceptor to the clrawor. The consideration of an 
acceptance nrny a rise out of such incle btedness 
existing hPtween the clrawer and acceptor, or eYen 
without suel1 irnlehte(lness where the acceptance 
is recPi,·erl liy the clrm,·ee in payment of a debt 
dne to him from the drawer. It may well be held 
that notice may he given to one commissioner for 
all, but it would not follow that one commissioner 
could make a contract for all." 
That the important thing- is the notice to the debtor 
is stated as follow::; in 6 C . .J.S. Assignments, Section 100, 
page 1156: 
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"If he (the assignee) wishes to secure himself as 
aFSainst intervening rights and equities, however 
it is essential that the assignee give notice of th~ 
assignment to the debtor, for it is almost uniform-
ly held that, insofar as may be necessary to give 
the debtor the benefit of intervening defenses or 
equity or protect him against being compelled to 
pay the debt twice or prejudice resulting from 
acts taken in ignorance of the assignment, it will 
not be effective against him until he has been noti-
fied thereof." 
If Cooper had presented the assignment in question 
to the City Council and/or the City Recorder it seems 
obvious that it would not have mattered whether or not 
the Recorder and/or City Council agreed to accept and 
l1onor the assignment but rather the City would have 
lwen bound, irrespective of any action on its part, to 
honor the assignment, because this would clearly have 
heen notice to the City. The crucial question is not 
whrther or not the City agreed to, consented to, or ac-
eeptrd the assignment, but whether or not it had no.tice 
of the same. Since this is the vital issue, the authori-
tif~s, statutes and cases cited by appellant in Point I of 
its argument, all of which deal with the authority of the 
l\layor to make contracts for and create liability of the 
City by his act, are immaterial to the basic issue in this 
ease. 
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POINT II 
THE NOTICE GIVEN TO THE MAYOR OF 
11HE Cl'l'Y CH' l\fOAB IN THIS CASE \VAS 
NOTICE~ TO THE CITY -WHICH \VAS SUFFI-
CIENT TO REQUIRE THE CITY TO HONOR 
THE ASSIGNMENT. 
It is evident that the 2\layor of the City of J\Ioab, 
based upon the acknowledgment signed by him (plain-
tiffs' exhibit 3), had full and complete notice of the 
assignnwnt. The question then resolves itself as to 
·whether or not the notice to the J\Iayor would be con-
sidered and deemed to be notice to the City. 
In Bank of Spri11g City Y. Rhea County, supra, the 
Court said the following in response to the contention 
that the notice of the assignment giYen to one of the 
commissioners who was also secretary of the board of 
commiRsioners (Jf the county waR not notice to the board 
itself or to the County: 
''As to the first point. 'l'his seems to be settled 
against the County in the case of Smith v. Hub-
bard, 85 Tenn. 306, 2:3 S.W. 36!=!. In that case it 
appeared that the conuty court of Smith County 
appointed seYeral commissioners to contract for 
thP erection of a bridge. A written contract was 
ent<~recl into hy them with King & Son, and by the 
latter was assig11ed to B.l<'.C. Smith. A portion of 
thP clcbt was paid by the defendants, but after-
wards the County refosed to pay the balance. The 
Circuit .Judge madP a finding of law and facts. 
The error relied upon hy the plaintiff in the Su-
preme Court was an expr0Rs finding by the cir-
cuit jwlge ... S<'COll<_], that before the plaintiff 
could r<'<'<>Yer of the defrmlaiits the price for the 
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huilding of the bridge, he was required to notify 
at least two of the three commissioners that he 
was entitled to receive the money, and get them 
to accept the order. The circuit judge found that 
such notice was not given until after $250 had 
heen paid by the county to the assignor, and 
though after transfer and assignment to the plain-
tiff, ·was a good payment, and a credit on the 
amount due under the instrument. The court said 
'-we a re of the opinion that this finding contains 
two distinct errors.' The two errors pointed out 
in the opinion were that the circuit judge erro-
neously found the instrument was not negotiable, 
and that he held that it was necessary to notify 
at least two of the three commissioners. The Court 
said that while the instrument was not strictly 
negotiable, it was assignable under the statute, 
and suit might be brought by the assignee in his 
own name, and hence that notice was not neces-
sary. The court continued: 'But, if notice had 
been necessary, we think that notice to one of its 
commissioners would have been notice to all, and 
that notice to two would have been better, as a 
matter of law, than notice to all.' ... This case 
settles the point that notice need be given to only 
one of the commissioners. Now, in the case before 
the Court it appears that Mr. McPherson was one 
of the commissioners. Notice to him was there-
fore, notice to the whole body of commissioners." 
In Thayer v. Lyman, 35 Vt. 644, 1863, the Supreme 
Court of Vermont said: 
''The plaintiff sued the principal debtor, and sum-
moned the town of Woodford as trustee upon two 
tow11 orders. Both had been assigned by the prin-
cipal debtor. As to the order B, the a_ssigned gave 
due notice to the selectmen (that is to two of 
them), but gave no notice to the town treasurer 
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of the aso-;ig11m(1 nt before ihe service of the trustee 
proecss. 'l111e plaintiff claims, that notice of the 
a.sRignmc·nt must he given to the town treasurer 
on whom the orderR wc>re rlrawn and by \d1om they 
were to he paid, and that notice to the selectmen 
is not enongh. But we think notice of the assign-
ment, 0itlwr to the selectmen or to the treasurer 
is good aud sufficient to protect the right of the 
assignee against the trustee process.'' 
Jn Burditt v. Porfrr, G::l Vt. 296, 21 Atl. 935, 1891, it 
was contended that noti«e given to the chairman of the 
board of :t],-e selectmen was insufficient to make the as-
~ignme11t valid against a garnio-;hment Rubsequently 
served 011 the board. 'J'he Supreme Court of Vermont 
referred to Thayer v. J,ymau, o-;nyJTa, and affirmed its de-
cision tlierein. r.l1 l1e Court said fort her: 
"\,Vhile one selectman cannot, without the con-
currence of a majorit~- of the eboard, bind his 
town by his contract, we see no valid reason that 
notire of the assignment of a debt against a town 
must be gi vPn to a majority of the selectmen. No-
tice to one of them is, in legal effect, notice to all, 
and to the corporation for which they act. The 
selectmen are by statute made the financial agents 
of the town, and charged with the general super-
vision of its affairs. '\Vlien a notice affecting the 
town's liability is ginu to a member of the board 
it is given for the town, and it becomes the duty 
of a member of tlie hoard to communicate the no-
tice to his associates. It is \vell settled that notice 
to an agent of the party, whose duty it is as such 
agent to act upon the notice, or to communicate 
his information to hiR principal in the proper dis-
charge of his trust aR such agent, is legal notice 
to his principal. rrhe principal is deemed to have 
notice of whatever is communicated to his agent 
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while acting as such in the transaction to which 
the communication related .... A town can receive 
notic.e only through its officers or other agents, 
and it therefore becomes the duty of the agent to 
communicate the notice received by him to the 
persons who may be called upon to act with ref-
erence thereto.'' 
Kaeser v. Teien of Starksboro, 116 Vt. 389, 77 A.2d 
831, 1951, states the following: 
"When a notice affecting the town's liability is 
given to a member of the board of selectmen, it is 
given for the town, and it becomes the duty of the 
member notified to communicate the notice of his 
associates." 
Ree also Douglass & Varnum v. Village of Morrisi:ille, 89 
Vt. 393, 95 Atl. 810, 1915. 
In Sintes v. Commerford, 112 La. 706, 36 So. 656, 
1904, the notice of the assignment ·was served upon the 
C'omptroller of the City of Nev;r Orleans. The Supreme 
Court of Louisiana, in holding that this notice bound the 
City, also inf erred that service on the ::\Iayor also would 
lie sufficient as follows: 
"As to the notice of the assignment, whilst it is, 
no doubt, true that legal process should be served 
on the mayor or other officer designated by the 
Charter of a municipal corporation, we can per-
ceive no sufficient reason why such corporation, 
as a matter of convenience to itself, may not des-
ignate a particular officer to .receive notices . of 
assignments of salaries and claims ... Any notice 
to the debtor is sufficient.'' 
Nf~\'Cral other decisions hold that notice to the comp-
troller is notice to the City. Third Nat. Bank of City of 
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Philadelphia v. Atlantic City, 130 FeJ. 731, 1904; Dick-
erson v. City of Spokane, 26 Wash. 292, 66 Pac. 381, 1901. 
In City 1Vat. Hauk Y. Friedman, 187 Ark. 854, 62 S.W. 
2d 28, 1933, the issue' was whether or not notice filed with 
the Secretary of the commisRion of a paving district was 
binding on the cfoit rict. rrhe Supreme Court of Arkansas, 
in answering in the affirmative, said: 
"Here it is undisputed that the orders were filed 
with the Secretary of the commission and this 
served to give it notice of the assignment of the 
refund to Friedman, whether the individual com-
missioners were actually informed of this or not. 
The only reason for giving any notice of an as-
signment of a debt to the debtor is to direct him 
to whom it should be paid and thus protect him 
from any snbRequent claim by the assignor.'' 
In Bell v. Board of Commissioners of Lake County, 
26 Colo. App. 192, 141 Pac. 861, 1914, verbal notice of the 
assignment was given to the ('hairman of the board of 
county commission0rs and also the county attorney. The 
Colorado Court held that the County had notice and 
said: 
"The contention seems to be made that because 
this information was not given in writing or com-
municated to the board while the members thereof 
were assembled as a board, it is not notice to the 
County. This contention, we think, is untenable. 
It is opposed to the doctrine of agency and the 
effect of information coming to agents as applied 
to individuals and corporations." 
"While it is true that the board of county com-
misf'ionern is the designated agent of the county, 
it is likewise true that the board ('annot hear ex-
14 
cept through the ears of the individual members 
con.stituting the board, not see except through 
their eyes; that each of said members, while act-
ing for the county, is an agent thereof, in a lim-
ited _sense, to the extent, at least, that information 
commg to each member while acting for the Coun-
ty may, for such purposes as are herein under 
consideration, be charged as notice to the coun-
ty. Such seems to be the uniform holding of the 
courts as to notice coming to the officials of a 
municipality of defects in its streets and other 
matters while in the course of their employ-
ment ... , and even though such notice come to 
the officials or agents while traveling the streets 
as private citizens." 
rrhe holding of Bell v. Board of Commissioners of 
Lake County, supra, was affirmed in School District No . 
. 'J \'. Central Savings Bank & Trust Co., 113 Colo. 487, 159 
P. 2d 361, 1945, where the facts are, in many respects, 
similar to the facts in the instant case. The Supreme 
Court of Colorado held that notice of the assignment 
given to the secretary of the defendant school district 
and later to the president was notice to the school district 
'd1ich was liable to the assignee for payment made to the 
assignor after it had notice of the assignment. 
From the foregoing cases it would seem that the fol-
lowing principles are applicable to the problem at hand, 
to-wit: 
1. Notice given to any one member of the govern-
ing board of a municipal corporation is notice to the cor-
poration itself. Bank of Spring City v. Rhea County, 
:·nipra; Thayer v. Lyman, supra; Burditt v. Porter, supra; 
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8infcs v. Co11111u,rforr7, supra; Hell v. Board of Commis-
swncrs, ~npra. 
2. ri1 hi,'; is trnc PYC'll m a stronger sense ·where the 
member of the gon'rning hoard to whom the notice is 
given is the clti0f cxceutiYe or presicfo1g officer of the 
board. Burditt \'. Porter, snpra; ,','i11tcs v. Commerford, 
supra; Bell v. Boarrl uf (!ornmissioncrs, supra; School 
flistrir:t No. 3 v. Central Sarings Bank and Trust Co., 
supra. 
:). Notice given to officers other than those serving 
on the governing ])oanl has bce11 npheld to be sufficient. 
Ba11k of 81Jri11g City v. Rhea County, supra; School D·is-
trict No. 8 v. Central 8arings and Trust Co., supra, (Sec-
retary); Thayer v. Lyma11, supra ('l'rcasurer); Sintes v. 
Co111mcrford, supra, Third Nat. Ballk v. Atlantic City, 
supra, and Dickerson v. City nf 81JOkanc, supra, (Comp-
troller); Bell v. Board of Com111issio11ers, supra (At-
torney). 
4. The notice need not be iu writing nor in any par-
ticular form. Bf'll v. Hoard uf Cmnmissioners, supra. 
5. The notice Heed not be i.;i \'en at a meeting of gov-
erning hoard. Bell \'. Board of Commissioners, supra. 
6. One of the hasic reasons for the foregoing prin-
ciples is that a mrn1her of il10 goycn1ing hoard or one of 
its offieers has n duty to l'<Hnrnunicate to the board the 
information Jiu l1as affecti11g tlw liability of the munici-
pal corporation. Kaeser v. Town of ,S'tarksboro, supra; 
City of A berdccu v. !Jank of A 11wr,11, Ell J\Iiss. 318, 2 So. 
2d 1.J:3, 1941; B111rlitt \'. J>nrfer, snpni. 
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It is worthy of note that in all of the cases involving 
tlii 8 issue which respondents' counsel has been able to 
fincl, the courts held the notice to be sufficient to bind 
the pnhlic body. In no case was the notice determined to 
be immfficien t. 
1t is apparent from the foregoing that if this Court 
is to follow the decisions made in other states it must find 
tliat the City of Moab had notice of the assignment in 
cpwstion. An examination of the Utah Statutes and 
HnlcH of Procedure further strengthens this conclusion. 
Section 10-4-23, Utah Code Ann., 1953, reads in part 
as follows: 
''The chief executive of cities of the third class 
shall be the mayor .... " 
Section 10-6-24, Utah Code Ann. 1953, provides, 
among other things, as follovrs: 
''He (the mayor of third class cities) shall from 
time to time give the council information con-
cerning the affairs of the city ... " 
'L'he ::\Iayor, as the chief executive officer of the city 
obligated hy law to keep the city council advised, is the 
logical person on 'Shorn any notice to the city would be 
st-rYed. It would be difficult to imagine any other munici-
pal officer who could better be given notice on behalf of 
the city. 
Rule 4 ( e) ( 5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
wliieh provides that personal service of process within 
tlit> Ntate shall be made "upon an incorporated city, by 
(ldi vrring a copy thereof to the mayor or recorder .... " 
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Under this rule if a summons were Jelivered to the 
mayor the Court would have jurisdiction to enter a judg-
ment against the eity irrespective of whether or not the 
mayor advised the city com1cil or other officer of the 
city of the service of the process. In other words, our 
i·ulcs contemplate that a city is bound by notice given to 
the city of a legal action by the delivery of the summons 
to the mayor. Certainly this same principle applies to 
notice of an assignment particularly when one considers 
that the cases from other jurisdictions are less exacting 
in their requirements as to notice of an assignment than 
they are as to the service of legal process. 
The underlying problem in the present case is that 
"\Ye have, in effoct, a contest between two parties who 
are not at fault in a general moral sense and this Court 
must assess the loss against one or the other. The City 
Council did not know of the assignment when it paid 
Holder. On the other hand Cooper (the assignee) had 
every reason to believe that the Mayor of City would 
perform his legal duty to communicate the notice to the 
City Council and that he need do nothing further to 
notify City. The question then becomes one of deter-
mining which of the parties must bear the responsibility 
for this breach of duty on the part of the Mayor. Re-
spondents submit that the l\Iayor is the agent of the City 
and that the City must bear the loss suffered in this 
situation by the respondents (and their predecessor) 
who had no relationship with the Mayor. 
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City of Aberdeen v. Bank of Amory, 191 Miss. 318, 2 
So. 2d 153, 1941, presents a fact situation similar to the 
present case. The facts are stated by the court as follows: 
''Crosby and Sherman were employed hy the City 
to do necessary engineering services required in 
the construction of a municipal airport wherein 
the City agreed to pay them the sum of $200.00 
for a preliminary survey and assistance in se-
curing the approval of the project by their Works 
Progress Administration, and in addition 5% of 
the funds for their supervision services. Crosby 
and Sherman secured a loan from the Bank in the 
sum of $3,000.00 for which they gave their note. 
To secure this note, they transferred and assigned 
in writing to the bank their contract with the City 
in which they directed the City to pay any 
amounts due or to become due them under their 
contract to the Bank ... The assignment to the 
Bank was dated May 20th, 1936. It was filed with 
the City Clerk. ... After receiving the notice the 
city paid Crosby and Sherman the amount for 
which judgment was rendered, $198.30." 
The City sought to reverse the judgment upon the 
grounds ''that the filing of the assignment with the City 
clerk was not legal notice to the city.'' The Supreme 
Court of l\Iississippi rejected this contention and said: 
"Under these principles this court notes that the 
municipal clerk is not only its clerical officer but 
is the custodian of all its books, records and pa-
pers. Part of his duties is to keep the governing 
officers of the municipality informed as to such 
records and papers. We are of the opinion tha.t 
the filing of the assignment with the city clerk 
was notice to the governing authorities of the 
municipality.'' 
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The reaso11s for tli0 decision i11 the ease last above 
referred to apply ·with en'n stronger force where the no-
tice is gi1'e11 to 11H• mayor who is the chief executive of 
the city aml 111(' rliief go1·el'lling officer. If notice to the 
rity de1·k is notice to the eity on the theory that he is 
bound to co1ffPY the 110ticc to the governing authori-
ties certuinly notice to thP chiPf executive and governing 
officer of the city must lw notice to the city. 
It follows from th<' foregoing that the City of Moah 
had notice of the assignm0nt and as a consequence there-
of was bound to hoIJor said assignm0nt, which it did not 
do, and respondents are entitled to the judgment against 
the City awaI"derl hy the trial court. 
POINT III 
IN ANSvVER TO APPELLANT'S POINT II, 
SINCE THFJ OBLIGA '11 ION OF THE CITY TO 
PAY THE ASSIGNEE UNDER THE ASSIGN-
1\lEN'l' vV.AS NO'l' ri1 HE CREATION OF A 
NJ1JW CON'l1RACT BUT RATHER THE 
TRANSFER OF THEJ RIGHT OF PERFORM-
ANCE UNDER AN EXISTING CONTRACT, 
THE SIGNA'rURE OF THFJ CITY RECORD-
ER TS NOT REQUIRED. 
It follows from what lurn heretofore been said in this 
brief that the o hlig·a ti on of the City to the assignee 
umler the assignmf'nt was not the making of a new con-
tract hut rather the' tra11.sfl.r of Uw right to performance 
of a colltract which was admittedly valid and executed in 
all partienlars as reqnircJ h? the statutes applicable 
thereto. 
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rri1e City Recorder could not prevent the valid trans-
fer of tlu· right of Holder to compensation from the City 
lo tl1c Assignee by refusing to sign or acknowledge the 
assignment. Therefore, the statute requiring the City 
Hc·corder to countersign all contracts made in behalf of 
the City (Section 10-10-61, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) 
is inapplicable to the assignment. Likewise the cases 
ei\C'(l by appellant under Point II of the brief are not 
relevallt to the issue before the Court. 
POINT IV 
IN ANSvVER TO POINT III IN APPEL-
LANT'S BRIEF, SECTION 10-7-77, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, IS INAPPLICA-
BLE TO THE PRESENT CASE. 
1 t might very well be argued that there was a pres-
c·nta tiou of claim by the plaintiffs as required by Section 
J0-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, from the fact ad-
mitted in appellant's brief that in December of 1962 the 
Cit:-, ( 'ou11cil ancl City Recorder were notified of the as-
sigmnent and thereafter payments were made to the 
n:-;:-:igHec and that this was within one year" after the last 
item of such account or claim accrued" on the theory 
that the contract between Holder and City was actually 
011e daim and that the limitation of one year provided 
hy 8Pction 10-7-77, \vould not start to run until after 
Holc1Pr was entitled to the last moneys under that 
contract. 
Ii is the primary contention of respondents that the 
following language in Section 10-7-77, Utah Code Anno-
tatPcl, HJ53: 
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''Every claim, other than claims above men-
tioned, against any city or town must be pre-
sented, properly itemized or described and veri-
fied as to correctness by the claimant or his agent, 
to the governing body within one year after the 
last item of such account or claim accrued, and if 
such account or claim is not properly or sufficient-
ly itemized or described or verified, the governing 
body may require the same to he made more spe-
cific as to itemization or description, or to be cor-
rected as to the verification thereof.'' 
was satisfied in this case when the contract between 
Holder and City \vas approved by the City Council and 
Recorder of the City, when statements were submitted 
to the City for payment to Holder for work done, and 
the same were paid. The City did make the payments to 
Holder and does not contend that Holder did not have a 
valid claim against the City and was not entitled to pay-
ment. This identical claim was transferred to the As-
signee. The right of the assignee was not based on a new 
claim but on the ownership of the Holder claim. The only 
question is whether or not the City had notice of the 
assignment so as to obligate it to make payment on the 
claim of Holder to the assignee in the assignment. 
Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P. 2d 882, 
1947, involved an action against Salt Lake City for the 
wrongful taking of water after an eminent domain pro-
ceeding was commended and later dismissed. The ma-
jority of the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court 
awarding damages and did not discuss the question of 
the failure of the plaintiff to present his claim under the 
statute in question. Justice -Wolfe, in his dissenting 
opinion, agreed with the majority of the Court as to the 
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right of the plaintiffs to recover, but disagreed as to the 
measure of damages. Justice Wolfe said the following 
with reference to the presentation of the claim question: 
'' rt'he second proposition: I think it well to men-
tion that the city urges as a bar to this action 
Section 15-7-76, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 
' ' now same section U.C.A. 1943. It urges that the 
plaintiffs did not file their claim with the city 
until April 17, 1939, though the condemnation 
suit was dismissed on January 7, 1938, and there-
fore the claim was not filed within one year after 
the cause of action a.rose as is required by the 
cited statute. It is my opinion that Section 15-7-76 
has no application to the claim here involved as 
to damages for deprivation of the use of the wa-
ter right from the date of the court order to the 
date of the dismissal of the condemnation suit by 
the City. The purpose of 15-7-76 was so that the 
eity would be apprised of the details of any ordi-
nary claims in order that agents of the city could 
timely and promptly look after the city's interest 
in securing evidence, etc., to def end any subse-
quent suits or as a. basis for settlement. In the 
case at bar the city started condemnation proceed-
ings. The agents of the city were fully apprised 
of what it was trying to take from the Moyles and 
in such situation I think no presentation of claim 
is required. The ordinary statutes of limitations 
govern.'' 
Counsel for the respondents has been unable to find 
only one Utah case dealing with an assignment of moneys 
under a contract with a city. This case is Salt Lake City 
v. O'Con1110r, 68 Utah 233, 249 Pac. 810, 1926, which 
deals with the question as to priority of claims (to 
mom•ys due the contractor from the city) between 
<l hank who was an assignee of the contractor and 
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the snrety company who furuished the bond to the 
contractor who alf.m had an assignment from the 
coutractor ms part of the application for the bond. 
The opinion recites that the bank gave notice of 
its assignment to the City but makes no mention as to 
whetlwr or not a claim \\'HS presented in the formal man-
ner rec1uinxl by Section 10-7-77. The Court held that the 
claim of the surety was superior. The fact that it did not 
discuss Section 10-7-77 indicates that the Court did no! 
feel that was pertinent to the case and essential to the 
rnlidity of the <'laim of either assignee against the City. 
The cases cited by appellant in support of its Point 
III do not deal with the question here presented as to 
whether or not an assignee of a valid claim against a 
city which has bee11 approved hy the city when presented 
hy the assignor must file the claim a second time under 
Section 10-7-77. Respondents contend that this must be 
Ea1swcrecl in the rn•gatin and that the only thing that 
would be required is that the city be given notice of the 
assignment in onlcr that the city could make payment 
to the proper person. The above quoted language from 
Moyle v. Salt Lake City, supra, suggests two reasons 
'Why Section 10-7-77 does not apply to the case at hand. 
:B'irst, if tlw eity has adual notice of the claim there is no 
need for presentation. Second, since the purpose of the 
statute is to gi\·e tlw city an opportunity to determine 
,,-lteth!::'r the claim is valid or invalid, it has 110 application 
where, as h('l"<', tl1c• claim is valid and was presented by 
Holder arnl HilJll'<J\'C<l hy the City Council 80 that the 
r1uestio11 is not \\'hethn the claim is valid but to deter-
mine to wltum pa .nrn~ll t 011 t lw claim :.,;houl<l be made. 
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CONCLUSION 
The claim of the respondents against the City of 
f\Ioab is not based upon an agreement on the part of the 
City to pay the assignee named in the assignment but 
rather is based upon the transfer of the existing liability 
whieh the City had to Davis C. Holder. This being the 
case, the issue is not whether the Mayor of the City could 
"billd" the City but rather whether or not the notice 
given to the Mayor was notice given to the City. It fol-
lows from the fact that the respondents do not rely on a 
contract made between the assignee and the City but 
rather on the assignment of an admittedly valid contract 
aud claim between the City and Holder the requirements 
of ihe Utah Statutes relative to contracts executed by 
the City are inapplicable. Respondents further contend 
that its position as an assignee of a valid claim against 
the City does not require that its assignment be pre-
sented as a separate claim to the City in accordance with 
Section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Since the 
sole issue is whether or not the City had notice of the 
aHsignment and the authorities cited in this brief sup-
port the proposition that notice to the Mayor was notice 
to the City, the judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. ROBERT ANDERSON 
P. 0. Box 1057 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Attorney for 
Plain.tiffs-Respondents 
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